costaid

Coping Strategies Against Information Disorder

Guidelines for first-liners

Authors:

Eliane Smits van Waesberghe & Tim Paulusse – Verwey-Jonker Instituut (Main Editors)

Leen D'Haenens & Joyce Vissenberg – KU Leuven

Tzvetalina Genova – International Management Institute

Wolfgang Eisenreich – Wissenschaftsinitiative Niederösterreich

Sonja Bercko Eisenreich – Integra Institute

Alenka Valjašková – QUALED

Pantelis Balaouras – Connexions

Declaration on copyright:

Chapter 2
Actions & Skills

Target group

These guidelines are targeted towards so-called "first-liners". "First-liners" is an overarching term for all people in direct contact with people who are vulnerable to information disorder, focused on groups in vocational education. Examples of people who fall under the umbrella term are: educators, teachers, trainers, youth counsellors and advisors, social workers and youth workers. This is a non-exhaustive list, however. The scope of this project also includes other people working in the educational, social or health care sector.

2.1 Introduction to this chapter

In order for first-liners to make disinformation discussable with youth, it is important that they are aware of and use certain skills in conversation. However, observing signs of belief in mis- and disinformation is more complex than it seems. The belief in disinformation itself is not observable, except when it is outspoken. Therefore, it can be considered tough to recognise when someone beliefs in disinformation, and when it is recognised, how to react appropriately. However, the belief in disinformation is closely related to the process of radicalisation. There is existing literature mapping out appropriate ways to observe and react to early signs of radicalisation in youth. In this chapter, tips and skills for recognising these signs and handling them effectively will be given. Firstly, first-liners should be enabled to identify the radicalisation through mis- and disinformation among youth. After that, this subject needs to be brought up in conversation in an open-minded way, in order to aid the youth effectively. The first-liners will have to think critically about information they gather in these conversations in order to assess how and why the adolescent beliefs what they belief. Information about these conversation skills, skills for the critical evaluation of information, and tips for identifying belief in false information in the context of radicalisation will be discussed in this chapter. Before that, however, the relation between the belief in mis- and disinformation and radicalisation will be explained more thoroughly.

The relation between disinformation and radicalisation

As explained in *chapter 1: Understanding 'fake news'*, disinformation exploits cognitive biases and psychological vulnerabilities, such as confirmation bias and the illusory truth effect, to manipulate individuals' perceptions of reality. The repetition of false information increases its perceived credibility, making individuals more receptive to radical ideologies that align with these false narratives. The resulting echo chambers on social media platforms further entrench these distortions, intensifying tendencies towards radicalisation.

Disinformation campaigns often exploit existing societal divisions, exacerbating tensions along ideological, political, or religious lines. As disinformation reinforces pre-existing beliefs, it fuels a sense of "us versus them," creating an environment conducive to radicalisation. Inflammatory content that demonizes certain groups can lead individuals to perceive violence or extremist actions as justifiable means to counter perceived threats.

The spread of disinformation erodes trust in established institutions, including mainstream media, government bodies, and academic institutions. As individuals lose faith in these institutions' ability to provide accurate information, they may turn to alternative, often radical, sources for guidance and validation. This shift further exposes them to extremist narratives that resonate with their disillusionment.

In short, disinformation is created and disseminated with a certain, often radical, narrative in mind. Disseminating this disinformation ensures that more people come into contact with it, which persuades more people to believe this narrative. This is a crucial step in the process of radicalisation.

However, this process of radicalisation is observable. In the next subchapters, information is provided on how to identify and proactively react to this process.

2.2 Identifying and acting on radicalisation

For first-liners to correctly identify, interpret and act on radicalisation, there is a need for guidance to do so. Some professionals in the field of youth work have developed a number of baseline questions which guided the creation of several recommendations in order to most effectively deal with radicalisation among youth. These questions are:

1. What basic knowledge about radicalisation should you have as a professional?
2. How can professionals recognise and interpret signals of possible radicalisation in young people? What are the perspectives for action in case of radicalisation or avoidance of radicalisation?
3. When, how, with whom and under what conditions should you share/report signals of possible radicalisation in young people?
4. How can you intervene preventively in radicalisation by focusing on protective factors?

In the next paragraphs, the answers to these questions will be given, as well as some recommendations of what is important to keep in mind when trying to identify, interpret and act on radicalisation amongst youth.

Question 1: what basic knowledge about radicalisation should you have as a professional?

Context-dependency

Radicalisation as a social issue is characterised by changing complexity and an unstructured nature. The appearance of radicalisation (such as underlying ideology and forms of manifestation) changes over time and circumstances (context). It involves continuous change, uncertainty, different and conflicting perspectives, and the interests of various stakeholders. Furthermore, it is often difficult to determine when enough information is available and when professional intervention is ready. Radicalisation as a phenomenon is therefore sometimes referred to as a "wicked problem," which requires a dynamic approach. It is a dynamic phenomenon that demands a dynamic perspective on how to address it. Professionals must learn to deal with these changes and uncertainties. Although the dynamic nature of radicalisation presents various challenges for youth professionals, there are ways to find guidance. The guideline assumes that working with radicalisation benefits from a "context-oriented approach." This means that professionals consider the (changing) circumstances and environments of young people and focus on strengthening their social and societal resilience to prevent radicalisation. This requires a professional attitude where professionals constantly evaluate which actions are proportional and effective. Three ways of working align with the unstructured (and therefore unpredictable) nature of radicalisation. Ideally, these three ways of working take place simultaneously:

- Trying out new things, approaches, and interventions (experimenting and innovating).
- Regularly evaluating and discussing the work on radicalisation, for example through research, as well as through (methodical) reflection and supervision (evaluating and reflecting).
- Utilising professionals who make a difference for young people and families through their specific motivation, involvement, and skills (excelling and excellent professionals).

How to deal with context-dependency

In any development process, uncertainties always exist. Within the context-oriented approach to working on radicalisation, scenario thinking is applied. This is a method that allows you to create a representation of what could potentially happen in the (near) future, in addition to the factual information available about a young person. It helps to understand the possible consequences or impact it may have and for whom. Scenario thinking can assist you in taking action in uncertain situations or where information is lacking. You can apply scenario thinking at different moments and in various situations, whether in on-site (crisis) situations or when you have more time for contemplation. Ultimately, scenario thinking revolves around the ability to ask questions about the circumstances (context) and what it means for the young person (impact). There should also be a focus on structural learning and collaboration.

It is also very important for first-liners to have consideration for the individual circumstances of the young person. They should be cautious in using the label 'radicalisation. This is because this term holds a stigma. Radicalisation is a phenomenon that evokes intense images and fears. Labeling a behavior or phenomenon as 'radicalisation' can have significant (negative) consequences for all involved parties: the young person themselves, their environment, and the relationship between the young person and youth professionals. Furthermore, radicalisation as a process entails a high degree of unpredictability, rendering a label always inadequate. For instance, young people can also undergo a process of 'deradicalisation' after a phase of radicalisation. Additionally, many young people with strong ideals already hold a hostile stance towards how they are approached and labeled. Therefore, there is a high likelihood that labeling exacerbates the situation and causes young people to withdraw from contact and assistance. In such cases, we achieve the opposite of what this guideline aims to accomplish, which is to view, empower, and guide a young person within the context of their own development while also addressing concerns about behavior or circumstances.

Because of the ever-changing context of radicalisation, the focus should lie on prevention instead of the radical ideas themselves. You should be aware that radical ideas can be part of the adolescent phase and, in themselves, may not be cause for concern but rather align with healthy development and the search for identity. However, young people can become entangled in radical views that pose a danger to their own development or to their environment.

First-liners should also take into account the available knowledge on risk, trigger, and protective factors for radicalisation when assessing a case and developing an approach. Primarily focus on enhancing resilience by strengthening protective factors against radicalisation. Risk factors for radicalisation are factors (behaviors, circumstances, characteristics) that can increase the likelihood of the emergence and development of radicalisation in young people. Additionally, specific events, often in combination, can initiate, accelerate (or decelerate), or even reverse a process of radicalisation. These are known as trigger factors. Protective factors contribute to the positive development of children and young people and can be of great value both in early preventive stages and in stages where non-violent radicalisation is already a concern. Strengthening protective factors does not focus on deficiencies but invests in the capacities of the young person and their environment. Research shows that strengthening positive factors is easier than mitigating negative conditions. Understanding risk, trigger, and protective factors provides guidelines for preventive approaches against radicalisation.

Next to this, first-liners should understand the role that information disorder and communication channels, both online and offline, play in the radicalisation process. The role of these concepts can be found in the other parts of these guidelines.

Question 2: how can professionals recognise and interpret signals of possible radicalisation in young people? What are the perspectives for action in case of radicalisation or avoidance of radicalisation?

Red flag signals

First-liners should develop sensitivity to 'red flag signals' and utilise a structured tool. It is not necessary for professionals to possess specialised background knowledge of (constantly evolving) manifestations of radicalisation. However, it is important for professionals to have a well-developed antenna for 'red flag signals' and to refer individuals to appropriate help in a timely manner and know how to seek specialist expertise. There are no checklists that can precisely determine whether someone is radicalising. The reality is more complex. It involves weighing signals and finding a way to do this in collaboration with experts. Strive to obtain a complete picture of the situation. Utilise a structured tool, for example the Dutch *niet-pluis instrument* from Stichting School & Veiligheid (2020). Some examples of red flag signals are:

- An increasing sense of belonging to a particular (political, religious, ethnic) group, or conversely, feeling like they don't belong anywhere.
- Breaking off old friendships in favor of new friends and social contacts from a radical group.

- Certain statements and specific language use emphasising us-versus-them divisions related to origin and religion, and/or violence.
- Changes in mood, isolating oneself, or seeking alternative ways of connecting with you, the social environment, or family.
- Noticeable changes in school performance or absenteeism.
- Engagement in different leisure activities.
- Participating in demonstrations.
- Rejecting attitude towards society and authorities.
- Distancing oneself from the rule of law, disdain for the system, or openly rejecting the authority of the state.
- Changes in clothing and appearance, such as a different hairstyle (growing it out or shaving it off) or tattoos symbolising a particular group.
- Recent exposure to one or more trigger factors.

Acquired knowledge and mindset

First-liners should also acquire knowledge and make use of tools and training that help professionals reach professional judgment and reflect on a case. Skills that are useful in recognising signs of radicalisation are for example:

- Being able to describe the behavior and statements of young people as objectively as possible, without including personal assumptions.
- Assessing safety risks effectively by distinguishing between concerning signals and the normal development of young people in their search for identity and growth.
- Adopting a broad perspective by considering both risk factors and protective factors.
- Taking an integrated view of the young person's life world by gathering information about their various domains of life.
- Creating awareness of one's own norms and values that influence judgment.
- Discussing and reflecting on the case by critically examining one's own judgment together with colleagues.

Question 3: When, how, with whom and under what conditions should you share/report signals of possible radicalisation in young people?

Procedure for identifying radicalisation

First-liners should acquire knowledge and make use of the 'Procedure for Mapping, Interpreting, and Sharing Possible Signs of Radicalisation.' It is important not to keep possible signs of radicalisation in relation to a young person to oneself. First-liners should

seek advice on interpreting the signs, potential next steps, and possible safety risks that could arise from engaging in a conversation with the young person. They should use the procedure outlined below for mapping, interpreting, and sharing/reporting signs of possible radicalisation.

- **Step 1**: Map out the signals of potential radicalisation. Try to be as objective as possible and clearly indicate when a subjective interpretation is made. Do not forget to also describe signs that dispute the potential radicalisation.
- **Step 2**: Make the safety risks tangible. Could this behavior pose a threat towards the person themselves? To someone else?
- **Step 3**: Seek advice based on the described signals and, if possible, arrive at an interpretation. In this step, one should also look at possible ways to follow up on these signals.
- **Step 4**: Discuss the signals with the young person and/or their parents. The goal of the talk should be described well. Do not let it be a monologue but ask for a response. If necessary, take a look at options for gaining perspective or at their wishes for support, for example.
- **Step 5**: Assess the risks (again). After step one through four, the initial estimation of the risks could need tweaking. Take the information learned in the previous steps to make the final risk assessment.
- **Step 6**: Decide, based on the concrete description of the security risks and the assessment of their severity, whether the signals of possible radicalisation should be shared externally.
- If external sharing of information is necessary due to serious security risks, decide which information needs to be shared and to whom it should be provided.

Affective professionalism

First-liners should practice the attitude and skills of 'affective professionalism.' This means that as a professional, you do not primarily work based on authority and cognitive action but rather on establishing a connection and showing empathy/engagement in what concerns the young person. Love for young people, empathising with them, genuinely getting to know them, taking an interest in them, and paying attention to their positive aspects are crucial. Collaborate with other professionals to ensure that a young person is surrounded as well as possible, creating a social support system that allows room for making mistakes. Insufficient familiarity with a young person increases the likelihood of tunnel vision when interpreting signs of radicalisation. Establishing a connection is incredibly crucial. Connection is also correction.

A tool that can help with the affective professionalism skill, which is important to make radicalisation and disinformation discussible, is self-disclosure. An important dimension of affective work is that as a youth worker, one presents oneself to the young person as a human being. Depending on the situation, it helps in doing so to share a bit about one's own

beliefs, values, ideals, disappointments, frustrations and anger. Sharing your experience, feelings and thoughts is called "self-disclosure". You reveal something about yourself that was hidden before. Self-disclosure is a concept introduced by Altman and Taylor in 1973 as a result of research on interpersonal relationships. According to this concept, the gradual revelation of feelings and personal experiences promotes both a sense of trust and the knowledge you have of someone else. Once you do this during your work as a youth worker we speak of professional self-disclosure. This happens verbally, non-verbally and contextually. So, for example, by literally saying something, by facial expressions, body posture and even by the brand and color of clothes you wear. The youth care worker can initiate self-disclosure, but the care recipient can also prompt this by asking personal questions.

Researchers Schnellbacher and Leijssen differentiated between four types of self-disclosure in the context of caregiving:

- Disclosures about experiences or facts in the therapist's life outside the therapy session or about personal views or values.
- Providing clarity about the therapist's thought process, the motives and rationale for his actions, the therapist's affective state.
- Revealing feelings, thoughts or images aroused by the client's story.
- Disclosures about experiences of the patient in the therapeutic relationship and with the client in the interaction.

As a general rule, self-disclosure is beneficial. In 80% of studies, the effects of self-disclosure are favorable, in 20% unfavorable. The effect is greatest on the "perceived warmth" factor, moreover, one likes the caregiver more. Moderate self-disclosure by the caregiver provokes self-disclosure by the client. However, it must be considered per context. In doing so, the following general guidelines apply:

- Do self-disclosure infrequently. The power of self-disclosure comes precisely because it is not habitual.
- Do it thoughtfully and deliberately. Try to find out what the client is actually asking before answering a question that requires self-disclosure. One can then better discuss the client's underlying need. Reasons from the patient may be:
  - It is not a question but a position statement,
  - One is testing the therapist,
  - One is seeking something, for example, reassurance.
- Choose words carefully: how empathetic or emotionally charged the telling is and also the degree of intimacy should match the patient's need. Overly personal self-disclosure is relatively unfavorable, but some degree of intimacy is needed.
- Be responsive before, during and after self-disclosure. So be sure to get feedback back, through questions or observation, on how the client is taking it up so you can further tune in.

Sonneveld, another researcher, notes in the context of youth work that being open about one's own experiences is not always easy and can be accompanied by uncertainty and

doubt. Self-disclosure must be done carefully, because we know from literature that making yourself vulnerable also has risks and pitfalls. This certainly applies to the topic of radicalisation as well. Recently, there is also literature available that provides insight into how self-disclosure can be methodically and expertly used within social work and social care, what the opportunities, pitfalls and risks are within this.

Prevent bias

First-liners should reflect on their own actions and avoid bias in conversations with young people. An important question in this regard is how professionals can distinguish between objective (guideline-based) and subjective (context-related) judgment. This is not an easy matter because professionals are also part of a society in which implicit ideas exist about different groups. Socialisation in this regard could influence one's own thinking and certain biases, potentially clouding objective judgment. However, it is crucial to adopt the right attitude as a professional, which is inviting for engaging in conversations, especially with young people (but also with parents). The first-liner's own norms regarding radicalisation should be subject to regular discussion, both within the team and within the organisation. Reflection and awareness of one's own actions are essential, particularly concerning existing stereotypes and prejudices in society towards certain groups. This helps prevent personal bias, allowing professionals to differentiate between objective (guidelines) and subjective (context-related) judgment. Studies show that there are four core elements which are fundamental for effective dialogue:

- Provide guidance to explore radical messages.
- Rejection of aggression.
- The dialogue should be egalitarian.
- Relationships should be based on trust so that adolescents and young adults feel comfortable expressing their doubts.

Look for underlying problems

First-liners should focus on recognising and addressing underlying issues in young people and consider this in professional judgment when dealing with radicalisation. Psychological and other issues can underlie or contribute to the radicalisation of young people. Inquire about these issues with the young person and take them into account when making professional judgments regarding radicalisation. By addressing underlying issues, you also address radicalisation. For example, use the iceberg model from McClelland (1985) when suspecting radicalisation or apply other methodologies described in the guideline to identify underlying issues related to radicalisation.

Source: Mulder, 2015.

| Visible behaviour	Invisible driving factors
Provocative behavior	Lack of wellbeing
Threatening statements	Problematic media use
(Support for) violence	Experiences of exclusion
Referring to ideology	Conflicts at home; inadequate upbringing
Group membership	Psychological and psychiatric issues
	Mild intellectual disability
	Traumatic events in personal life and social environment

Question 4: how can you intervene preventively in radicalisation by focusing on protective factors?

Resilience

In order for first-liners to act to prevent radicalisation, they should focus on protective factors, for example resilience. According to a review of all the literature on radicalisation by Campelo et al., published in 2018, scientific studies on factors related to radicalisation primarily focus on risk factors. There is less attention given to protective factors that can actually prevent someone from becoming radicalised. However, protective factors can be of great value both in the early preventive stages and in stages where non-violent radicalisation is already present. Research indicates that strengthening positive factors is easier than mitigating negative circumstances. Strengthening protective factors does not focus on deficiencies but rather invests in the capacities of the individual and their environment. Resilience proves to play an important role in this regard, often understood as an individual's ability to "bounce back" after a traumatic event. In a review from 2021, researcher Stephens, Sieckelinck, and Boutellier conclude that the concept of "resilience" forms an important foundation for a common framework for preventing polarisation, radicalisation, and extremism, and that resilience should not only be viewed at an individual level but also at the level of social categories such as family, peer groups, neighborhood, or community.

So, what types of interventions are involved then? Increasing resilience is not only about the individual but also requires attention to the individual's environment. Furthermore, interventions benefit from a long-term perspective, as countering radicalisation should not depend on breaking news incidents (such as acts of terror). The model below illustrates the context. The individual, with their personal characteristics and traits, forms the core.

Surrounding the individual are the risk factors for radicalisation that are associated with the individual's environment. These risk factors are largely based on Ranstorp's kaleidoscopic model from 2016. The figure clearly shows at a glance that the involvement of professionals from different domains is necessary to establish protective programs.

Source: Ranstorp, 2016.

In the youth domain, many prevention activities are now focused on strengthening the resilience and resistance of young people who may be susceptible to radicalisation. This approach is also chosen in the policy priorities of the government. Many protective programs, aimed at enhancing resilience, focus on preventing or neutralising negative influences and events, or on developing better coping mechanisms to deal with them.

Interventions can focus on placing the individual at the center and/or influencing the context/environment in which the individual operates. In the model described above, the outer circles represent the themes that protective programs target. These include:

- **Democratic education**: learning to take a more nuanced view of the world and politics, and promoting active citizenship.
- **Ideological resilience**, particularly digital resilience against fake news and conspiracy theories.
- **"First-aid" for identity issues**, including religious and ideological education. Guiding young people in their search for identity.
- **Family support**: promoting positive family relationships.
- **Self-actualisation**: fostering a stronger sense of self-worth and personal agency.
- **Social skills and norms**.

These themes largely align with the government's policy priorities for strengthening resilience against radicalisation. The mentioned programs aim to protect against social alienation. They focus not only on preventing harm but also on increasing the developmental

opportunities and resilience of individuals and families. One of the key recurring elements in testimonies of former radicals is the perceived significant growth within the radical environment. Therefore, it is important to provide young people with a positive alternative in terms of personal growth. Steering societal resilience requires professionals to create alternative spaces where young people can develop.

The researchers Cankor and Noor, in their report from 2021, operationalised the intended goals and approaches used within the six types of protective programs:

Programme	Goal	Approach
Democratic education	Making young people independent, critical citizens (resilient against radicalisation)	- Teaching young people to have a more nuanced view of the world and politics - Promoting acquaintance with a diverse society - Promoting active citizenship
Ideological resilience	Teaching young people to think critically and independently and develop a realistic worldview (resilient against ideologies)	- Promoting media literacy - Encouraging young people to critically examine messages from others and learn to recognise underlying intentions
"First-aid" for identity issues	Guiding young people in their search for identity	Teaching young people to shape their multiple identities
Family support	Resilient parenting	- Direct: Supporting and guiding families - Indirect: Empowering children to be resilient against conflicting norms and values, polarisation, exclusion, and radical influences
Self-actualisation	- Discovering who you are (talents, opportunities and possibilities) - Personal growth (resilient against group dynamics, recruiters and extremist religious ideas)	- Increasing self-worth - Strengthening one's own religious identity - Talent development - Gaining more insight into qualities, possibilities, and opportunities

Social skills and norms	Providing young people with social frameworks (socialisation)	- Teaching young people to remain true to themselves without causing harm to others - Learning about other perspectives

There are three levels of resilience that can be distinguished:

- Individual resilience,
- resilience within communities,
- societal resilience.

At each level, several existing programs (interventions) are described that enhance resilience. Additionally, the importance of partnerships and what they may entail is discussed.

Individual resilience

Individual resilience refers to the process, capacity, or outcome of successful adaptation despite challenges or threatening circumstances one faces. The literature presents various initiatives and suggestions for collaborations that focus on enhancing self-confidence, empathy, responsibility, multiple perspectives, multiple values, moral engagement, and/or (digital) literacy of individuals.

Resilience within communities

Resilience within communities can be described as *"a process in which different members of a community collectively develop adaptive capacity to take a positive path in negative circumstances"* (quoted from Norris et al., 2008, p. 131). A key term in the literature on community resilience is "collective efficacy": social cohesion combined with a willingness to take action on behalf of the broader community.

Societal Resilience

In developing and strengthening societal resilience, social bonding, social bridging, and social linking are important. This involves collaboration between different communities, such as youth work and education (social bridging). It also includes connections with important

stakeholders, such as local, regional, and national government institutions (social linking). The researchers Mutsaers and Demir describe two models in their publication of 2020: the *"Netwerk Sociale Onrust en Maatschappelijke Spanningen"* (Network Social Unrest and Societal Tensions) model and the Aarhus model. These models extensively address the criteria for social bonding, social bridging, and social linking. The models place significant emphasis on establishing and maintaining connections within institutions and agencies (separately from each other), between institutions and agencies, and between these institutions, agencies, and society as a whole, including government, ethnic groups, religious communities, and political activists.

Effective elements in protective programmes

Effective elements can be described as 'the key or most successful components of an intervention that ensure that the intervention has the desired effect,' thus making it effective. The working elements are the core elements through which the intervention 'works' and brings about the intended effects for specific target groups in a specific context (e.g., at school or in a community center). Since the working elements are essential parts of the intervention for achieving the goals, they should be retained when making adjustments. They are specific to certain (sub)goals and (sub)target groups of the intervention.

According to the report of Cankor and Noor from 2021, three main categories of substantive working elements can be identified:

1. Interventions targeting caregivers: Caregivers acquire knowledge and understanding of various topics such as stereotypes, discrimination, exclusion, radicalisation, and polarisation, and the consequences and risks associated with them. They also gain insight into the adolescent phase and acquire pedagogical knowledge. The process of acquiring knowledge and understanding also includes becoming aware of one's own actions, such as awareness of one's own parenting philosophy, parenting behavior, and their influence on child development.
2. Interventions targeting either caregivers or young people: Caregivers and young people learn skills such as social skills, parenting skills, communication skills, as well as effective problem-solving, navigating situations involving discrimination, utilising support from their (informal) network, and expressing criticism towards society. The development of critical thinking skills is also included as a skill. The acquisition, refinement, and/or practice of skills are addressed in all described interventions.
3. Interventions targeting young people: Working on self-perception includes aspects such as self-confidence, self-efficacy, self-reflection, self-regulation, future prospects, self-discipline, self-awareness, and connecting with one's own emotions and feelings.

Within the substantive working elements, a further distinction can be made between assets (skills) and resources (social networks/environment). All described interventions work on assets. Important assets include positive identity, self-confidence, self-regulation, and social skills. In some interventions, attention is also given to resources. Tapping into resources

from the environment means, for example, breaking the taboo of seeking help, enabling parents to build (informal) networks around parenting and access relevant institutions, and helping young people understand the importance of having a network. In addition to substantive working elements, methodological working elements are also present. The six most common methodological working elements in the interventions are:

1. Information transfer: Various methods facilitate successful knowledge transfer, including the use of films (visual materials can be a powerful learning tool), discussions and dialogues where participants share knowledge and experiences and learn from each other. Shared background and language between the trainer and participants can also contribute to more effective knowledge transfer and communication.

2. Role of the trainer: The role of the trainer, coach, facilitator, or debate leader is essential for the success of the intervention in various ways. The trainer ensures a safe learning environment and an atmosphere of trust within the training or guidance process. Trainers can serve as role models for young people and have an influential role. In most interventions, it is important for the trainer to be culturally sensitive. In some interventions, the trainer shares a similar background and/or language with the participants. Research shows that a shared identity between the messenger and the recipient can help information be better retained and understood by the recipients, and the recipients have a more positive attitude towards the messenger (Eldredge et al., 2016).

3. Practice and skill acquisition: Skill practice can take various forms, such as role-playing with a training actor or co-participant, practicing specific behaviors during the training where the trainer can provide corrections or assistance, behavioral planning, repetition to enhance information retention, and assigning homework.

4. Group approach: Through group conversations, dialogues, debates, and discussions, participants can share insights and learn from each other. It also contributes to the realisation that they are not alone in grappling with certain issues, and participants can experience support from one another.

5. Focus on the participant's experience and knowledge: Interactive methods that allow participants to share their own ideas and experiences are used to prioritise the participant's experience and knowledge. This approach helps the trainer better relate to the participants' lived experiences.

2.3 Digital Skills Identicator

Until recently very few tools were available to policy makers, practitioners, and researchers to assess the broad spectrum of digital skills amongst young people. Researchers working on the youth skills project have filled this gap by developing a unique, internationally validated, 31-item survey instrument – the youth Digital Skills Indicator (yDSI). The yDSI measures a combination of skills and knowledge items across four distinct domains – technical and operational (TO); information navigation and processing (INP); communication and interaction (CI); and content creation and production (CCP) skills) – comprising functional and critical aspects of digital skills (see Figure 1).

Figure 1: The four yDSI digital skills domains incorporating functional and critical aspects

Across all four dimensions a distinction should be made between being able to use the functionalities of information and communication technologies (ICTs) (functional aspects) and understanding why ICTs are designed and content is produced in certain ways and being able to use that knowledge in managing interactions in and with digital spaces (critical aspects).

2.4 How to identify false information

In the era of information abundance, it might be difficult to spot fake information and escape media bubbles. However, you may use a variety of resources and methods to learn to spot false information and increase their exposure to alternative viewpoints. In this chapter, we will present several resources that can be of assistance. Remember, nevertheless, that no single method can wipe out all misinformation or puncture all media bubbles. You may take steps towards a more well-rounded and educated perspective of the world only by integrating various resources, being proactive in confirming information, and actively seeking other opinions.

Fact-checking tools

Fact-checking websites

Websites that objectively evaluate the veracity of claims, statements, and news items, such as Snopes, FactCheck.org, and PolitiFact, play an essential role in the fight against disinformation. These initiatives can be independent, or they may be embedded within the activities of media and news companies. For instance, the Flemish website factcheck.vlaanderen provides independent fact-checks about various messages related to current events, politics, and health. Since a few years, the Flemish public broadcaster VRT has embedded a department specifically dedicated to fact-checking in their newsroom. In all cases, users are able to assess the veracity of content they encounter because to the platforms' rigorous process for analysing and verifying information from diverse sources.

Websites dedicated to assessing the veracity of reports do so in a methodical fashion. To verify or disprove contents, they look to data, analysis, expert opinion, and official documentation. Transparency and accountability in the fact-checking process are ensured by the fact-checkers' adherence to strong editorial rules and principles of journalistic ethics. They frequently assign grades or labels to news articles or assertions in order to show their credibility. *True*, *False*, *Misleading*, *Partially True*, and *Mostly False* are all possible labels for these claims. Articles and websites are given labels or badges that indicate their general reliability or the extent to which they have been subjected to fact checking.

Debunking erroneous information and making necessary corrections is a key service provided by fact-checking websites. They examine the data and provide in-depth explanations to disprove false statements made by politicians, public personalities, and the media. Searchable databases of verified claims are available on a wide variety of websites. People may quickly acquire reliable information and check the validity of widely circulating allegations with this tool.

Organisations that verify information frequently work together and join global fact-checking networks. This partnership promotes international fact-checking standards by encouraging the exchange of information and expertise. The fact-checking community gains a means of holding each other to account.

Browser extensions

NewsGuard and Media Bias/Fact are two examples of browser add-ons which analyse and rate news websites in order to support consumers determine which ones to trust. The goal of these updates is to increase people's knowledge of the media so they will be enabled in critical reading of news and websites. These add-ons rank and analyse news sources instantly for their customers. This add-on shows the website's or article's credibility, political bias and fact-checking history right in the browser. It provides a quick assessment of the information's credibility and possible bias.

The Media Bias/Fact-Checking add-on assesses the reliability, objectivity, transparency, and editorial bias of a news source, among other criteria. Expert teams often conduct the evaluation by investigating the credibility and veracity of the source's claims. It encourages openness by informing people on ownership, funding, and political influence over various news outlets. Users are better able to evaluate the reliability of the reporting if they are aware of any biases or conflicts of interest.

The Media bias and Fact-Checking add-ons classify news outlets according to their perceived political spectrum. They could describe themselves as "left-leaning," "right-leaning," "centre," or utilise a more nuanced approach with a sliding scale. Users are better able to recognise their own ideological leanings with the use of these labels. Some add-ons also take into account data from third-party sources that verify claims. They call attention to whether or not a news source has been fact-checked before, they note which assertions have been disproved or validated, and they give connections to pertinent fact-checking organisations.

Reverse image search

Reverse Image Search, such as Google Reverse Image Search, is a valuable technique that empowers users to find similar or related images based on an existing image. Its utility lies in verifying an image's credibility, origin, or potential misuse. The process involves comparing the image's distinctive traits, patterns, and metadata with an extensive image database. Reverse image search engines function by juxtaposing the visual characteristics of an uploaded image with those already stored in the system.

Prominent search engines like Google and Bing offer reverse image search capabilities, serving as invaluable tools to distinguish between an original image and one that has undergone digital alterations. Through this feature, users gain insight into the image's frequency of usage in various contexts, unveiling its provenance and potential modifications. This capability plays a crucial role in detecting the dissemination of false information or fraudulent images, ultimately aiding in maintaining the authenticity and accuracy of visual content online.

Reverse Image Search may also help find the original or higher-resolution copies of a low-resolution or compressed picture, which can be useful for a number of applications, including graphic design and research, as well as monitoring copyright infringement and unauthorised use of images.

The limitations of Reverse Image Search should not be overlooked. Image dimensions, quality, cropping, and manipulation all have an impact on the final product. It might be difficult to obtain an exact match or do a reverse image search for photographs that are rare, unusual, or have a low internet profile.

Social media verification tools

Verification tools for social media are made to aid users in sifting through the vast amount of content available on these sites and determining the reliability of the information they find. These resources offer users with background information and fact-checking tools to support preventing the spread of false information.

Facebook and Twitter, for example, have launched fact-checking initiatives in partnership with non-profits. In these initiatives, fact-checking marks are affixed to material that may be controversial or deceptive. Users who come across marked content can then utilise the label as a gateway to further reading or fact-checking.

The veracity of material uploaded on social media is often checked by independent fact-checking organisations with which the platforms have formed partnerships. By working together, fact-checkers may help ensure that consumers have access to accurate information and well-researched articles on a certain issue. Users can report questionable content, which is then reviewed by moderators. Users can alert platform moderators to questionable information so that it can be fact-checked and labelled, among other possible actions.

In order to examine user-created material, certain verification systems employ AI and machine learning techniques. These programmes analyse metadata, user participation, and surrounding context to determine the potential for disinformation or manipulation. The legitimacy and standing of the sources posted on social media may be checked using the capabilities provided by the verification tools. They can go over the offered URLs, search for

trust signals, and compare the results to those from reliable fact-checking groups and databases.

How to be media smart?

To be "media smart" is to have the knowledge, experience, and critical thinking skills to successfully negotiate the complex terrain of today's media, make educated choices, and take part in the digital era with integrity. Media literacy is the ability to evaluate information sources critically and to make well-informed choices on what to believe and how much to trust.

Being educated about the media begins with mastering the basics of media literacy. The capacity to consume, process, and produce media is included. Those who are media literate are capable of assessing the veracity and possible biases of the information they receive because they are familiar with the methods utilised in media creation, the various media types, and the information they present. To be media educated one must be able to evaluate content critically. To do this, it is necessary to be sceptical of the data being offered, open to new ideas, and willing to look for information from a variety of credible sources. Critical thinkers are sceptical of unverified assertions and rarely take anything at its value.

People who are competent in the media can judge the trustworthiness of their sources. They look into the credibility, authority, and openness of the source, and then compare the data to other reliable ones. One can make a better well-informed decision after considering the possible biases or intentions of the source. In order to confirm claims, debunk disinformation, and get a more in-depth grasp of complicated subjects, they participate in fact-checking to verify the authenticity of material.

Recognising the possible biases of various media providers is another part of media literacy. Those who are educated about the media recognise the possibility of bias in the media and work to gain a balanced perspective on a specific issue from a variety of sources. They are aware that bias may be communicated through the selection of narratives, the framing of those stories, the language used, and the absence of particular opinions.

To be media literate is to understand how to spot and avoid common forms of media manipulation. Recognising false imagery, emotional appeals, propaganda, and clickbait titles are all part of this. People who are media literate are always on the lookout for efforts to manipulate them and aggressively question the motivations behind the material they receive.

Tips for enhancing your ability to spot false information

To identify whether a piece of information is reliable or whether it is a case of mis- or disinformation, young people can engage in two main actions: source-checking and fact-checking. Source-checking concerns an investigation into the source of the information, such

as the website or social media account who shared it, but also into the source who may have first created the piece of information.

According to the [Stanford History Education Group](), one of the most successful strategies to check whether the source of a piece of online information is reliable is lateral reading. Lateral reading concerns leaving the website where the piece of information was first found to check whether other sites are reporting about the same event in the same way. When other reliable sources are sharing the same piece of information, one can conclude that the initial source of the information is reliable as well. Additionally, to identify whether a source is reliable, the following questions can be asked:

- Who is the owner, institution running the website/social media profile?
- Who is the author of the text or social media post?
- What are their motivations? (financial, political, social, psychological)
- What audience do they intend to reach?
- Are they using automated technologies (e.g., bots)?
- Do they intend to mislead?
- Do they intend to harm?

Next to source-checking, fact-checking is a strategy that can be used to identify whether a piece of information is credible. While it is helpful in judging the reliability of a source, lateral reading has also proven effective in determining whether the piece of information itself is correct. By checking what other reliable sources are writing about the same event, one can identify to what extent and in which ways the initial piece of information is in line with these other messages. Next to lateral reading, users may consider the following elements when judging the credibility of a piece of information:

- Context surrounding the information/message;
    - Look at layout and design of page
    - Check where links lead to
    - Check who the people being interviewed/cited are
    - Check the dates events occurred and when the information was published
    - Check the location where the information was published (e.g., geo-tagging of posts on social media). Do the locations fit with the event that is reported?
- Language;
    - What kind of language does the headline use? What tone? (e.g., clickbait, sensational vs. informative).
    - Are spelling and grammar correct?
    - Is the reporting neutral and informative or does it reflect an opinion, is it persuasive?
- Images: check the authenticity of visual material;
    - Reverse image search (as explained previously)
    - Image background check (EXIF data)
    - Does the material look reliable? Does it look like it has been manipulated?
    - Who is credited? (e.g., copyright of images)

- o Could it be a deepfake/AI-generated image? (more on deepfakes and how to detect them will be discussed in *Chapter 3: technology & tools)*
- o Are numbers/statistics/charts displayed correctly, or are they manipulated?

In the current information environment, it is inevitable that users encounter false information. When spotting a piece of mis- or disinformation, it is extremely important to undertake the right action to prevent the further spread of false information. First, in the case of false information on social media, users should report the message using the different functionalities that are offered by platforms such as Facebook and Twitter. Additionally, it is important to avoid sharing the information with others, even if it is with the purpose of sharing an example of mis- or disinformation. Lastly, it is useful to warn others about the fact that the piece of information is false.

Core competencies of media literacy

In 2019, the Broadcasting Authority of Ireland has launched the Irish National Media Literacy Campaign which has developed a framework of three core media literacy competencies and their skill indicators for individuals:

- **Core Competency 1**: Understand and critically evaluate broadcast, digital and other media content and services, in order to make informed choices and best manage media use.
    - o Recognise different content types, such as advertising, editorial, fact and opinion.
    - o Understand the editorial processes involved in producing different content types.
    - o Deconstruct media messages and recognise influencing factors, such as stereotyping, bias, unfair portrayal, inappropriate content or context, lack of evidence etc.
    - o Analyse and assess the motivations of the content producer and the context in which the content is presented.
    - o Evaluate content and services for truthfulness, reliability and value for money.
    - o Understand the regulatory environments which apply to media content and services.

- **Core Competency 2**: Access and use broadcast and digital media content and services in a safe and secure manner, to maximise opportunities and minimise risks
    - o Effectively search for, find, navigate, and use media content and services.
    - o Make informed choices about the value and protection of personal data, while using media content and services.

- o Use media content and services in a safe and secure manner, including making informed use of technical security features, restricting access and avoiding inappropriate and potentially harmful content.
  - o Recognise how the infrastructure of the internet can influence media choices, patterns of behaviour and diversity of content/views.
  - o Awareness of the legal and moral implications of the use of media content and services and technology.
  - o Transact online in a safe and secure manner.
  - o Recognise and understand the potential benefit and possible risks linked with emerging technology.

- **Core Competency 3**: Create and participate, via media, in a responsible, ethical and effective manner, in the creative, cultural and democratic aspects of society.
  - o Construct messages by using text, images, audio and code.
  - o Create media content and products by producing text, images, audio, video and code.
  - o Create content for public use (e.g. using creative commons licences).
  - o Publish, upload, share content online.
  - o Compile and curate content.
  - o Differentiate between and select the most effective services / platforms for public and private communication.
  - o Understand and manage how networks are formed and function.
  - o Know and respect digital rights and responsibilities.
  - o Engage in online learning opportunities.
  - o Express personal opinions and respond to the opinions of others.
  - o Find and create opportunities to participate in the civic and cultural aspects of society.
  - o Recognise, manage and appropriately challenge inappropriate behaviour (abusive behaviour/content; inappropriate or potentially harmful content; negative stereotyping; unfair portrayal; bias; lack of pluralism; discriminatory content; propaganda; hate speech) across all media.

Educational tools

There are also various educational tools which have been developed to inspire and support teachers in empowering the development of critical media and information literacy in their students. In Flanders, the Edubox on fake news is a tool developed by the Flemish media literacy agency, the Flemish public broadcaster, Artevelde University college, and Imec. Step-by-step and guided by videos of real journalists providing additional explanations, young people will learn how to identify false information. In the US, the Stanford History Education Group has developed its successful "Civic Online Reasoning" curriculum. This curriculum provides free lessons and assessments that aid educators in teaching students to evaluate online information. The lessons provided in the Civic Online Reasoning Curriculum

generally are concerned with answering one of three questions: (1) Who is behind the information? (2) What's the evidence? (3) What do other sources say?

Importantly, teaching media and information literacy extends beyond the classroom into online educational games. In the past years, several games have been developed in which players are taught the strategies that producers of false information use to more easily identify them when faced with pieces of information online. Examples of such games are:

- Bad News Game (https://www.getbadnews.com/books/english/)
- Harmony Square (https://harmonysquare.game/en)
- Cat Park (https://catpark.game/)
- Go Viral! (https://www.goviralgame.com/books/go-viral/)
- Under Pressure (https://www.getunderpressure.com/

2.5 Agents of change

In the dynamic landscape of contemporary media in which the pervasive influence of disinformation poses a significant challenge, it is imperative to recognise the crucial role played by the so-called "agents of change". Agents of change are the catalysts of transformation: capacity builders. These may be families (through parental mediation), educators, journalists, and policymakers/regulators. These agents of change can work together in new modes of governance that should not be just formal from the top (institutions) but also informal from the bottom up (networks). The development of fact-checking and news literacy programmes shows new spaces that can foster new collaborations. Citizens and journalists should collaborate in the fight against information disorders by leading fact-checking efforts.

Influencers can exert great influence among citizens and should be made aware of possible influence by companies or governments. Especially if their target audience is young people, professional training or a codex they should act upon is recommended.

Journalists also have become more aware of the need to show more openness about the newsroom, their core business, the news production process, including how to check sources and claims. Nowadays, audiences expect communication sharing rather than solely information sharing.

Media literacy intervention programmes, stimulating critical thinking, a better understanding of the media logic, the role of data and algorithms, are crucial instruments for unpacking information disorders.

There are also systemic ways to counter disinformation that can lead to polarisation and further disruption in already conflict-ridden societies: the creation of a regulatory framework or co-regulation initiatives together with media actors, or the professionalisation of complaints commissions regarding the operation of the media, councils for journalism, etc.

In Europe, the Digital Services Act and the European Media Freedom Act are coming into force in 2024. The proposal of the Digital Services Act offers additional protection against the unjustified removal by very large online platforms (above 45 million users in the EU) of media content produced according to professional standards. The European Media Freedom Act will strengthen the editorial freedom of media companies and protect them from unjustified, disproportionate and discriminatory national measures, protecting the pluralism of European media landscape. Media companies will also benefit from fairer and more transparent allocation of state advertising expenditure.

A repository of UK-based media literacy intervention programmes can be found at Ofcom ['Making Sense of Media' programme](#):

There are two useful resources mentioned in the document on the Ofcom toolkit:

- [Ofcom's Media Literacy Research Library](#)
- [Ofcom's Media Literacy Initiatives Library](#)

A focus on EurOMo, the Euromedia Ownership Monitor.

This is a pilot conducted by the Euromedia Research Group, commissioned by the European Commission as part of the European Action Plan for Democracy to investigate in the European member states which owners control the leading news media, the level of media concentration, and the transparency of information on this. The study has now been completed for 15 member states. EurOMo provides a database and visualisation of the various media corporations and their underlying ownership structures and evaluates the transparency of those relationships, both to citizens through accessible sources, and to regulators. It also provides context for this source material in the form of country reports. A third component of EurOMo is an educational tool aimed at 16- to 18-year-olds that raises awareness of the importance of transparency around media ownership and the possible consequences for media content. After all, news literacy is a crucial skill for young people.

EurOMo's guiding principle is the importance of a diverse range of information for a healthy democracy. A diverse range of information means that citizens are exposed to a multitude of views that are made accessible to them, giving them the opportunity to form an informed opinion on societal problems without being encapsulated by one perspective. The concern around media concentration and media pluralism and the search for concrete measures to protect pluralism in Europe has a long history. Exactly 30 years ago, in late 1992, the European Commission released a Green Paper on Pluralism and Media Concentration. A binding text in the form of a Directive around harmonisation in this field did not materialise, despite several consultations by the Commission. This failed attempt at a balanced approach in the various European media markets shows the political sensitivities surrounding this issue. Successive enlargements of the European Union to include Central and Eastern European countries, all young media markets with their own vulnerabilities, have only diminished the feasibility of such a balancing act.

News and information are ubiquitous, but being able to distinguish between quality and pulp, between truthful and 'fake' is what counts. The [EurOMo educational toolkit](#) on media ownership underlines the need for transparency on this. The toolkit is already available in nine languages.

There is a continued need for close monitoring of news media financing and ownership structures as a prerequisite for evaluating existing policies and effectively developing new ones. See there, 30 years later, the crucial importance of the Action Plan for European Democracy (2020) and the European Media Freedom Act (2022) as a reinforced, renewed

attempt to encourage media pluralism and strengthen control over media ownership and independence.

There are systemic ways to counter disinformation that can lead to polarisation and further disruption in already conflict-ridden societies. Alongside the creation of a regulatory framework, co-regulation initiatives together with media actors, the professionalisation of complaints commissions regarding media performance, councils for journalism, etc. are beneficial trajectories. We also refer the reader to the Digital Services Act.

2.6 References

A toolkit for evaluating media literacy interventions. (2023, March 16). Ofcom. https://www.ofcom.org.uk/research-and-data/media-literacy-research/approach/evaluate/toolkit

Benkler, Y., Farris, R., & Roberts, H. (2018). *Network Propaganda: manipulation, disinformation, and radicalization in American politics*. https://library.oapen.org/bitstream/20.500.12657/28351/1/9780190923624.pdf

Bennett, W. L., & Livingston, S. (2018). The disinformation order: Disruptive communication and the decline of democratic institutions. *European Journal of Communication*, *33*(2), 122–139. https://doi.org/10.1177/0267323118760317

Benson, P. L., Mannes, M., Pittman, K., & Ferber, T. (2004). Youth development, developmental assets, and public policy. *Handbook of adolescent psychology*, 781-814. https://doi.org/10.1002/9780471726746.ch25

Braddock, K. (2014). The utility of narratives for promoting radicalization: The case of the Animal Liberation Front. *Dynamics of Asymmetric Conflict*, *8*(1), 38–59. https://doi.org/10.1080/17467586.2014.968794 Business.gov.nl. (2023). EU Digital Services Act (DSA) brings new rules for digital service providers. *business.gov.nl*. https://business.gov.nl/amendment/digital-services-act-dsa/?gclid=CjwKCAjwp8OpBhAFEiwAG7NaEsrcAaR7SffDRd9jOerC4Z-PeUBz-aeaMOl4TLe3fzmtHW9Quy8IEBoCvoEQAvD_BwE

Campelo, N., Oppetit, A., Neau, F., Cohen, D., & Bronsard, G. (2018). Who are the European youths willing to engage in radicalisation? A multidisciplinary review of their psychological and social profiles. *European Psychiatry*, *52*, 1–14. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.eurpsy.2018.03.001

Cankor, E. & Noor, S. (2021). *Weerbare individuen, weerbare gemeenschappen. Een inventarisatie van interventies gericht op het versterken van weerbaarheid van individuen en gemeenschappen.* Utrecht: Movisie. From https://www.socialestabiliteit.nl/publicaties/rapporten/2021/04/22/rapport-weerbare-individuen-weerbare-gemeenschappen

Carr, A. (2015). The Handbook of Child and Adolescent Clinical Psychology. In *Routledge eBooks*. https://doi.org/10.4324/9781315744230

Eldredge, L. K. B., Markham, C. M., Ruiter, R. A., Fernández, M. E., Kok, G., & Parcel, G. S. (2016). *Planning health promotion programs: an intervention mapping approach*. John Wiley & Sons.

Euromedia Ownership Monitor. (2023, October 18). *Media literacy resources - Euromedia Ownership Monitor*. https://media-ownership.eu/media-literacy-resources/

Frau-Meigs, D. (2022). How disinformation reshaped the relationship between journalism and media and information literacy (MIL): Old and new perspectives revisited, *Digital Journalism, 10*(5), 912-922, https://doi.org/10.1080/21670811.2022.2081863

Helsper, E., & Schneider, L. (2021). *The yDSI – Measuring Young People's Skills and Knowledge*. https://yskills.eu/the-ydsi-measuring-young-peoples-digital-skills-and-knowledge/

Helsper, E.J., Schneider, L.S., van Deursen, A.J.A.M., & van Laar, E. (2020). *The youth Digital Skills Indicator: Report on the conceptualisation and development of the ySKILLS digital skills measure*. KU Leuven, Leuven: ySKILLS. https://zenodo.org/record/4608010#.ZCr8AuxBwUY

Henretty, J. R., Levitt, H.M. (2010). The role of therapist self-disclosure in psychotherapy: A qualitative review. Clinical Psychology Review, 30(1), 63-77. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.cpr.2009.09.004

Kruit, L. (2021*). Inzet van eigen ervaringen. Bij sociaal werk*. Noordhoff.

Masten, A. S., Best, K. M., & Garmezy, N. (1990). Resilience and development: Contributions from the study of children who overcome adversity. *Development and psychopathology*, *2*(4), 425-444. https://doi.org/10.1017/S0954579400005812

Media literacy initiatives library. (2023, March 16). Ofcom. https://www.ofcom.org.uk/research-and-data/media-literacy-research/approach/evaluate/toolkit/initiatives-library

Media literacy research library. (2023, March 16). Ofcom. https://www.ofcom.org.uk/research-and-data/media-literacy-research/approach/evaluate/toolkit/research-library

Mulder, P. (2015). *McClelland Theory of Motivation*. Retrieved [insert date] from Toolshero: https://www.toolshero.com/psychology/mcclelland-theory-of-motivation/

Mutsaers, P., & Demir, S. (2020). *Handen ineen voor meer veerkracht bij jongeren. Preventie van radicalisering en polarisatie: een literatuuronderzoek naar beleid, prioriteiten, programma's en samenwerkingspartners*, Platform JEP. From https://www.platformjep.nl/binaries/platformjep/documenten/publicaties/2020/04/20/handen-ineen-voor-meer-veerkracht/JEP+Handen+ineen-Veerkracht-DEF.pdf.

Norris, F. H., Stevens, S. P., Pfefferbaum, B., Wyche, K. F., & Pfefferbaum, R. L. (2008). Community resilience as a metaphor, theory, set of capacities, and strategy for disaster readiness. *American journal of community psychology*, *41*, 127-150. https://doi.org/10.1007/s10464-007-9156-6

Peeters P. & Westen K. (2021). *Behandelen met eigen ervaring. Onbewust bekwaam!?* SWP.

Ranstorp, M. (2016). *The root causes of violent extremism.* Ran issue paper, 4 January 2016 Taken from Sieckelinck, S., & Gielen, A. J. (2018). *Protective and promotive factors building resilience against violent radicalisation.* Ran issue paper, April 2018 from https://home-affairs.ec.europa.eu/system/files_en?file=2020-09/ran_paper_protective_factors_042018_en.pdf

Ruiz, C. D., & Nilsson, T. (2022). Disinformation and Echo Chambers: How disinformation circulates on social media through Identity-Driven controversies. *Journal of Public Policy & Marketing*, *42*(1), 18–35. https://doi.org/10.1177/07439156221103852

Russell, P. (2019) Be Media Smart: A National Media Literacy Campaign for Ireland. *Journal of Information Literacy,* *3*(2), p. 272-275, ISSN 1750-5968. doi: https://doi.org/10.11645/13.2.2715.

Scheffer, M. & Alphen, S. van (2021). *Praktische handvatten voor het inzetten van ervaringskennis.* www.ervaringskennisinzetten.nl

Schnellbacher, J., & Leijssen, M. (2009). The Significance of Therapist Genuineness From the Client's Perspective. *Journal of Humanistic Psychology*, *49*(2), 207–228. https://doi.org/10.1177/002216780832360

Security, C. C. F. C. (2022, February 23). *How to identify misinformation, disinformation, and malinformation (ITSAP.00.300) - Canadian Centre for Cyber Security.* Canadian Centre for Cyber Security. https://www.cyber.gc.ca/en/guidance/how-identify-misinformation-disinformation-and-malinformation-itsap00300

Sieckelink, S., & Gielen, A. J. (2020). *Veerkracht bevorderen bij opgroeiende jongeren. Inzetten op beschermende factoren.* Platform JEP. Den Haag: Expertise-unit Sociale Stabiliteit, Ministerie van Sociale Zaken en Werkgelegenheid. https://www.platformjep.nl/documenten/publicaties/2020/02/03/veerkracht-bevorderen-bij-opgroeiende-jongeren

Sonneveld, J. (2022). *Benutten van ervaringskennis in het jongerenwerk. Literatuurverkenning.* Lectoraat Youth Spot, Hogeschool van Amsterdam.

Stephens, W. O., Sieckelinck, S., & Boutellier, H. (2021). Preventing Violent Extremism: A Review of the Literature. *Studies in Conflict & Terrorism*, *44*(4), 346–361. https://doi.org/10.1080/1057610x.2018.1543144

The Poynter Institute. (n.d.). *International Fact-Checking Network - Poynter.* Poynter. https://www.poynter.org/ifcn/

Van Wonderen, R. (2023). *Rechts-extremistische Radicalisering op Sociale Media Platformen.* Verwey-Jonker Instituut.

Van Wonderen, R. (2023). *Richtlijn / onderbouwing Radicalisering.* Verwey-Jonker Instituut.

Van Wonderen, R. & Peeters, M. (2021). *Werken aan weerbaarheid tegen desinformatie en eenzijdige meningsvorming. Evaluatie lesprogramma Under Pressure.* Utrecht: Verwey-Jonker Instituut. https://www.verwey-jonker.nl/wp-content/uploads/2022/04/120550_Werken-aan-weerbaarheid-tegen-desinformatie-eenzijdige-meningsvorming.pdf.